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Abstract
The general question of how environmental dynamics affect the behav-
ioral interaction in an evolutionary economy is considered. To this end,
a basic model of a dynamic multi-sector economy is developed where the
evolution of investment strategies depends on the diversity of investment
strategies, social connectivity and relative contribution of sector specific
investments to production. Four types of environmental dynamics are ex-
amined that differ in how gradual and how frequent environmental change
occurs. Numerical analysis shows how the socially optimal level of diver-
sity increases with the frequency and rapidity of the changes. When there
is uncertainty about which type of environmental dynamics will prevail,
the socially optimal level of diversity increases with the degree of risk
aversion of the policy maker or the society.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary reasoning and agent-based modeling are standard practice in var-
ious disciplines, including social sciences (e.g., Binmore, 1994; Galor and Moav,
2002; Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; Mirowski, 2007). A typical evolutionary model
uses a population of entities that undergo selection and variation. Although
specific domains ask for the development of particular types of model, several
common, general questions arise. Here we aim to address one such question,
namely how does a dynamic environment influence the behavior of an evolution-
ary economic system consisting of multiple agents employing different behavioral
strategies. The relevance of this question is evident: few economic environments
are static.
Generally, one cannot expect evolution in a changing environment to ap-
proach a steady state. What matters is not so much how well the agents
adapt if given enough time, but how fast they adapt to a new challenge. In
a socio-economic context a wide range of environmental variables can be identi-
fied: macroeconomic conditions, technological opportunities, policies and insti-
tutions, and natural resources. Most studies of social behavior through evolu-
tionary methods have been limited to constant environments, letting selection
pressure depend on the population distribution. In part, this allows for an-
alytical treatments, as has been the common approach in evolutionary game
theory (both in biology and the social sciences). The addition of a dynamic en-
vironment requires a numerical or computational approach. As environmental
economics deals with the economic analysis of exploitation of natural resources,
abatement of environmental pollution, and human-induced climate change, dy-
namic environments are prevalent. The evolution of strategies is important
when heterogeneous groups of users, polluters, or harvesting strategies are in-
volved (Ostrom, 2000; van den Bergh, 2007). Dynamic environments may cause
certain strategies to become evolutionary stable and others to become unstable.
We will not only draw upon the social sciences but also make use of certain in-
sights from evolutionary biology. Evidently, many explicit and implicit insights
on the influence of environment on evolution are available here.
For our purpose a relevant distinction is between exogenous and endoge-
nous environments. Whereas systems with only exogenous variables are rela-
tively simple, endogenous variables generate complex feedback systems. Un-
fortunately, most real-world systems studied by biologists and social scientists
are of the latter type. Resource dynamics (e.g., Sethi and Somanathan, 1996;
Noailly et al., 2003) and dynamic control of a pest population that evolves
resistance to pesticides (Munro, 1997) are policy-relevant examples. Another,
general example is a coevolutionary system in which two heterogeneous popula-
tions cause selection pressure on one another (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). This
leads to very complex coevolutionary interactions because the environment of
each evolutionary (sub)system is evolving as well. Coevolution thus implies a
particular type of dynamic and endogenous environment (Noailly, 2007).
With regard to the evolutionary system, there is a range of theoretical start-
ing points and modeling approaches (Eiben and Smith, 2003; van den Bergh,
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2004). First of all, one can choose to use very theoretical, abstract models of the
evolutionary game type. However, adding dynamic environments here will lead
to systems that are no longer amenable to analytic solutions. Numeric simula-
tions of multi-agent systems form an alternative to the analytic approach that
offer much more flexibility in examining system behavior. They allow a distinc-
tion between local and global environments, and between stationary and mobile
agents. They further allow to study the influence of population size, and the
effects of dynamic environments on group and network formation (Bergstrom,
2002; Henrich, 2002). In addition, different assumptions can be made regarding
selection factors and innovation mechanisms (random mutations, deterministic
trends, recombination) and bounded rationality of agents (habits, imitation).
In this article we investigate the impact of various types of general environ-
mental dynamics on the socially optimal type of behavioral interactions among
the agents in the population. We consider the general structure of a dynamic
non-aggregate multi-sector economy. Agents have individual investment strate-
gies that specify how they invest their respective income. Their objective is
to maximize their individual welfare. They prefer investment strategies which
give high welfare. Their rational capabilities are bounded and their informa-
tion is limited. The only information available to the agents is the investment
strategies and the welfare of their fellow agents. The behavioral interactions in-
fluence how the agents use this information to evolve their investment strategies
through imitation. Our framework postulates that the environmental dynamics
are beyond the control of the policy maker, while he or she can regulate (some
aspects of) the agent interactions. Various types of government regulation, in-
formation and education affect the search for and effectiveness of innovation by
economic agents. In particular, by regulating how accurately agents can imitate
each other, a policy maker can control the diversity of strategies within the pop-
ulation. Examples of policies that influence diversity are patent and copyright
laws, conditions for competition for public R&D funds and subsidies, and the
support or enforcement of industry standards.
We will study the effect of diversity on welfare numerically through computer
simulations. We will address two research questions. The first is whether it is
true that different environmental dynamics require different degrees of diversity
for the agents to achieve a high welfare. The second question follows from
the fact that environmental dynamics are not only beyond the control of the
policy maker, but that they are also uncertain to him. This raises the issue of
adequate policies under uncertainty: how do agent interactions that work well
for one type of environmental dynamics perform under another environmental
dynamics? Depending on the degree of risk aversion of the policy maker or the
society, different policies can be recommended.
As for the environmental dynamics, we focus on two general aspects of en-
vironmental change: how gradually it occurs, and how often. Gradualness and
frequency of change are two aspects of an environmental dynamics that can
relatively easily be observed and recognized. Depletion of a mineral resource,
for example, typically manifests itself over an extended period of time, while a
biotic resource like fish can disappear literally overnight. Or a remote agricul-
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tural community is normally exposed to environmental hazards less frequently
than one surrounded by a heavily industrialized region. If a policy maker can
anticipate these aspects of environmental change, he or she might want to steer
behavioral interaction such that economic agents can adapt well.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
production and growth in an economy with a very general structure and presents
the evolutionary mechanism of behavioral interaction. In Section 3 the relation
between an investment strategy and the income growth rate is studied. Section 4
describes the experimental setup. Section 5 provides simulation results and
interpretations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economic model
2.1 General features of the model
Consider a population of agents with the objective to reach a high level of indi-
vidual welfare, which can only be achieved by a sustained high income growth
rate. Each agent can invest its respective income in a finite number of capital
sectors. How it allocates its investment over these sectors is expressed by its
individual investment strategy. Invested capital is non-malleable: once invested
it cannot be transferred between sectors. Standard economic growth and pro-
duction functions describe how the invested capital accumulates in each sector
and contributes to income. These functions are not aggregated: growth and
returns are calculated independently for each agent. Two agents with different
investment strategies can experience different income growth rates and income
levels.
The agents understand that there is a causal link between an investment
strategy and economic performance as expressed by the income growth rate,
but they cannot use calculus to find an investment strategy that maximizes the
income growth rate. Instead, the agents employ the smartest search method
that nature has in store, evolution, and they evolve their investment strategies
by imitation with variation. Since they prefer a high income growth rate over a
low income growth rate, they imitate the investment strategy of a fellow agent
when that fellow agent realizes an income growth rate that is high relative to
their own income growth rate and that of their other fellow agents. Imitation is
not perfect. Changes that are introduced during imitation guarantee diversity in
the pool of strategies and keep the evolutionary search alive. In the terminology
of evolutionary theory an agent selects another agent based on a property (the
phenotype) that is indicative of its current economic performance and imitates
its investment strategy (the genotype) with variation.
2.2 Strategies, investment, and production
All variables and parameters of the economic model are summarized in Table 1.
The population approach means that accounting of capital investment, produc-
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Table 1: Variables and parameters of the model
|P | population size
k average number of neighbors per agent
N neighbors of an agent
C clustering coefficient of the network
n number of investment sectors
β scaling factor of production
δ discount rate
σ diversity control parameter
Kia capital that agent a has accumulated in investment sector i
pii production coefficient of investment sector i
sia fraction of income that agent a allocates to investment sector i
Ya net domestic income of agent a
γa income growth rate of agent a
tion, and income takes place at the level of individual agents. Let Ya(t) be the
income of agent a at time t and let n be the number of available investment
sectors. Formally, the investment strategy sa(t) of an agent can be defined as
an n-dimensional vector
sa(t) = [0, 1]
n
,
∑
i
sia(t) = 1. (1)
The partial strategy sia(t)—which is the i
th element of a strategy—determines
the fraction sia(t)Ya(t − 1) of income that agent a invests in sector i at time
t. Each agent must invest its total income in one sector or another, so the
partial strategies must be non-negative and sum to one. The set of all possible
investment strategies is an n− 1 dimensional simplex that is embedded in n-di-
mensional Euclidean space. We call this simplex the strategy space.
Capital accumulation in each sector depends on the sector specific investment
of each agent and on the global deprecation rate δ. Deprecation is assumed to
be equal for all sectors and all agents. The dynamic equation for non-aggregate
growth per sector is
Kia(t) = sia(t)Ya(t − 1) + (1 − δ)Kia(t − 1). (2)
An extended version of this equation that accounts for dynamic prices can be
found in the appendix. To calculate the income Ya(t) from the capital that agent
a has accumulated per sector, we use an n-factor Cobb-Douglas production
function with a constant elasticity of substitution,
Ya(t) = β
∏
i
Kia(t)
pii(t), (3)
where β is a scaling factor that limits the maximum possible income growth
rate. The relative contribution of each sector to production is expressed by a
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dynamic vector of non-negative production coefficients pi(t) = 〈pi1(t) . . . pin(t)〉.
To enforce constant returns to scale, all production coefficients are constraint
to add up to one,
pi(t) = [0, 1]
n
,
∑
i
pii(t) = 1. (4)
Similar to the strategy space, the set of all possible vectors of production co-
efficients is an n − 1 dimensional simplex that is embedded in n-dimensional
Euclidean space.
Production coefficients can depend on an array of economic dynamics, like
technological development and environmental dynamics. When the technology
or the environment changes, the production coefficients can change as well.
Progressive desertification of farm land for example increases the dependency of
farmers on irrigation. This can be interpreted as an increase of the production
coefficient of irrigation, while some or all of the other production coefficients of
the agricultural production process would decrease to compensate. Evolutionary
economics raises the question of what happens if the production coefficients
change. For this reason we model the environmental dynamics as exogenously
defined changes in pi(t). This is a general approach that can also be applied to
other economic dynamics such as technological development. Section 4 describes
how we implement these changes and how we test whether or not they have an
impact on behavioral interactions.
To measure how well a population of agents is adapted to a certain economic
environment, we use the expected log income E[log Y (t)] of all agents at time t.
Expected log income emphasizes an egalitarian distribution of income. Techni-
cally speaking, an economic agent with constant relative risk aversion prefers a
society with high expected log growth and high expected log income. Let |P |
be the total number of agents in the population P . We calculate expected log
growth as
E[log Y (t)] =
1
|P |
∑
a
log Ya(t). (5)
The individual income growth rate γa(t) is
γa(t) =
Ya(t)
Ya(t − 1)
− 1. (6)
Expected log income relates to expected log income growth as
E[log Y (t)] =
t∑
i=1
E[log(γ(i) + 1)] + E[log Y (0)], (7)
where expected log income growth is defined as
E[log(γ(t) + 1)] =
1
|P |
∑
a
log(γa(t) + 1). (8)
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2.3 The social network
As has been extensively discussed by Wilhite (2006), agent-based simulation
of economic processes needs to give proper attention to the social network.
Communication links between economic agents, individuals and institutions,
are neither regular nor random. They are the result of a development process
that is steered by geographic proximity, shared history, ethnic and religious
affiliation, common economic interests, and much else. We use a generic class
of social networks that reproduce a number of stylized facts commonly found
in real social networks, namely small world networks (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi, 1959)
that have a scale-free degree distribution (generated by a stochastic process
with preferential attachment) (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999) and that have a high
clustering coefficient C (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).1
Before the start of each simulation we use a stochastic process to generate
a new bi-directional network where the nodes are agents and the edges are
communication links. The process assigns to each agent a a set of peers Na
that does not change during the course of the simulation. If agent a is a peer of
agent b, then a will consider the income growth rate and the investment strategy
of b when choosing an agent for imitation, while b will consider the income
growth rate and the investment strategy of a. On the other hand, if a and b
are not peers, they will not consider each other for the purpose of imitation.
The generating process starts from a circular network where each agent has two
neighbors, i.e., average connectivity k = 2. It then iteratively adds new edges to
the network until the desired average connectivity k is reached. The agents for
the next new edge are chosen at random with a probability that is proportional
to both their connectivity k (hence the term “preferential attachment”) and
their proximity in the network, i.e., the inverse of the minimum number of links
to traverse from one agent to the other.
The random way in which the network is created guarantees that the av-
erage distance between any two agents is very short, significantly shorter for
example than in a regular grid. The preferential attachment leads to a very
skewed distribution of peers per agent, with some agents having several times
the median connectivity. These well connected agents act as information hubs
and dominate the flow of information. A high clustering coefficient implies that
if two agents are peers of the same agent, the probability that they are also
peers of each other is significantly higher than the probability that two ran-
domly chosen agents are peers. This leads to the emergence of blocks within
the social network that exhibit a high level of local interconnectivity.
For the social network we use an average connectivity of k = 10. In a
population of 200 agents this value results in a highly connected network—the
average distance between any two agents in the network is 2.7—while main-
1In their seminal paper Watts and Strogatz (1998) define the clustering coefficient Ci of a
node i as the number of all direct links between the immediate neighbors of i divided by the
maximum number of links that could possibly exist between them. They define the clustering
coefficient C of the entire network as the average clustering coefficient of the nodes of the
network.
7
Clustering coefficient (norm. hist.)
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0
2
4
Average distance (norm. hist.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Number of neighbors (PDF)
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Number of neighbors (CDF)
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
Figure 1: Network statistics
taining the overall qualities of a complex social network. Figure 1 shows some
key statistics collected from 10,000 networks of 200 agents that were created
by the stochastic growth process using these values: a normalized histogram
of the clustering coefficient C of each network (average C is .66), a normalized
histogram of the distance between any two agents in each network, the prob-
ability density function (PDF), and the cumulative density function (CDF) of
the number of neighbors per agent in each network. Note the relatively high
probability of having 20 or more neighbors when the average connectivity is 10
neighbors. Such significant numbers of highly connected agents do not exist in
regular grid networks or random networks of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi type, yet their
existence in real social networks is well established (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002).
They generally act as information or transportation hubs and accelerate the
dissemination of goods, viruses and ideas.
2.4 The evolutionary mechanism of behavioral interac-
tions
From the point of view of evolutionary theory (Nowak, 2006), agents and invest-
ment strategies are not the same: an agent carries or maintains a strategy, but
it can change its strategy and we still consider it to be the same agent. Because
every agent has exactly one strategy at a time, the number of active strategies
is the same as the number of agents.
At each time step t an agent may select one of its peers in the social network
and imitate its strategy. If that happens, the strategy of the imitating agent
changes, while the strategy of the agent that is imitated does not. The choice of
which agent to imitate is based on relative welfare as indicated by the current
growth rate of income. The imitating agent always selects the peer with the
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highest current income growth rate. Only if an agent has no peer with an income
growth rate higher than its own, the agent does not revise its strategy.
If imitation were the only mechanism by which agents change their strategies,
the strategies of agents that form a connected network must converge on a
strategy that was present during the initial setup. However, real imitation is
never without errors. Errors are called mutations in evolutionary theory. They
are fundamental to an evolutionary process because they create and maintain
the diversity on which selection can work. In this model we implement mutation
by adding some Gaussian noise to the imitation process. That is, when an
agent imitates a strategy, it adds some random noise drawn from a Gaussian
distribution with zero mean. This causes small mutations along each partial
strategy to be more likely than large ones. The exact formula by which agent a
imitates and then mutates the strategy of agent b is
sa(t) = sb(t − 1) + N(0, σ), (9)
where N(0, σ) denotes a normally distributed n-dimensional random vector with
zero mean and standard deviation σ per dimension. Because partial investment
strategies have to sum to one, we have to enforce N(0, σ) = 0—for example by
orthogonal projection of the Gaussian noise term onto the simplex—resulting in
the loss of one degree of freedom. The error term is further constraint to leave
all partial strategies positive. Needless to say that we do not imply that our
boundedly rational agents engage consciously in such mathematical exercise.
Subjectively they merely allocate their income such that none is left.
The sum of squares of the n partial errors, i.e., the square of the Euclidean
distance covered by the error, follows a chi-square distribution with n − 1 de-
grees of freedom and mean (n − 1) ∗ σ2. In equilibrium, when all agents try to
imitate the same perfect strategy, the expected standard deviation of the partial
strategies will in fact be σ. Since the parameter σ controls the diversity of the
investment strategies, we will call it the diversity control parameter, or simply
diversity. It is the only free parameter of this evolutionary mechanism and has
potential policy implications.
3 The evolutionary dynamics
3.1 The growth rate of a strategy
If we want to understand the impact of environmental dynamics on how agents
evolve their strategies we need to understand if and how these environmental
dynamics affect which agents are imitated. Whether the strategy of an agent
is imitated depends on whether the agent has a higher income growth rate
than those agents it is compared with. We call the mapping from investment
strategies to income growth rate the growth function. The growth function
calculates the equilibrium growth rate that an imitating agent realizes if it
holds on to a particular investment strategy. If the growth function maps one
strategy to a higher equilibrium growth rate than another strategy, then our
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evolutionary agents will prefer this strategy over the other strategy and imitate
it. In this way the growth function indicates which of any two strategies will
survive and propagate. Since it depends only on the order of income growth
rates—i.e., which of any two agents has a higher income growth rate—whether
an agent is imitated, the evolutionary dynamics is invariant under any strictly
increasing transformation of the growth function. Any two growth functions
that are strictly increasing (or decreasing) transformations of each other lead to
the same evolutionary dynamics.
Let us start the derivation of the growth function with an analysis of the
equilibrium ratio of sector specific capital to income, Kia(t)/Ya(t), that will be
achieved if an agent holds on to a particular strategy. The dynamic equation of
this ratio is
Kia(t)
Ya(t)
=
sia(t)Ya(t − 1) + (1 − δ)Kia(t − 1)
(γa(t) + 1) Ya(t − 1)
=
sia(t)
γa(t) + 1
+
1 − δ
γa(t) + 1
Kia(t − 1)
Ya(t − 1)
.
(10)
This equation is of the form
x(t) = a + bx(t − 1), (11)
which under the condition 0≤b<1 converges monotonically to its unique stable
equilibrium at
lim
t→∞
x(t)=a/(1 − b).
This condition is fulfilled here: investment is always non-negative and sector
specific capital cannot decrease faster than δ. With constant returns to scale,
income cannot decline faster than capital deprecation, and we have γa ≥ −δ.
For the moment, let us exclude the special case γa =−δ. Then, considering that
0<δ≤1, we have the required constraint
0 ≤
1 − δ
γa(t) + 1
< 1 (12)
and we conclude that the ratio of capital to income converges to
lim
t→∞
Kia(t)
Ya(t)
= lim
t→∞
sia(t)
γa(t) + 1
/
(
1 −
1 − δ
γa(t) + 1
)
= lim
t→∞
sia(t)
γa(t) + δ
.
(13)
Equation 13 describes a unique stable equilibrium to which the economy of
an agent converges monotonically. We ignore the limit notation and combine
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equation 13 with equation 3 to calculate income at equilibrium as
Ya(t) = β
∏
i
(
sia(t) Ya(t)
γa(t) + δ
)pii(t)
= β
Ya(t)
γa(t) + δ
∏
i
sia(t)
pii(t).
(14)
We can now solve for γa(t) to derive the growth function
γa(t) = β
∏
i
sia(t)
pii(t) − δ. (15)
Let us return to the special case γa = −δ. According to equation 2, capital
per sector decreases at the deprecation rate δ only when it receives zero invest-
ment, and it cannot decrease faster. This implies that with constant elasticity
of substitution, a growth of γa = −δ is only possible if every sector with a pos-
itive production coefficient receives zero investment. This implies sia(t) = 0 for
at least one partial strategy, and so equation 15 holds also for the special case
γa = −δ.
3.2 Efficiency and level sets of investment strategies
How does the income growth rate of an imitating agent compare to the income
growth rate of a rational agent with perfect information? The term
∏
i sia(t)
pii(t)
has a single optimum at sa(t)=pi(t), allowing a maximum growth of γ
opt(t) =
β
∏
i pii(t)
pii(t) − δ. This is the income growth rate that a rational agent with
perfect information would expect to achieve. Its exact value depends on the
location of the production coefficients in the simplex. In an n-factor economy
the term
∏
i pii(t)
pii(t) varies between a value of 1/n in the center of the simplex
where all production coefficients are equal, and a value of one in the corners of
the simplex where one sector dominates. In order to remove this variability from
the growth function, and to allow an easy comparison with the income growth
rate of a rational agent with perfect information, we define the efficiency E(s, t)
of a strategy s(t),
E(s, t) =
∏
i
(
si(t)
pii(t)
)pii(t)
. (16)
The efficiency of a strategy measures the fraction γa(t)/γ
opt(t) of optimal growth
that an agent achieves with this strategy on given production coefficients, as-
suming that δ = 0. If one strategy leads to a higher equilibrium growth rate
than another, it is also more efficient. Efficiency is therefore a monotonous
transformation of the growth function that preserves all information on which
agent imitates which other agent, removes the variability due to the location
of the optimum on the simplex, and allows us to measures growth in terms of
what a rational agent with perfect information would achieve.
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Figure 2: Average efficiency as a function of Euclidean distance to the optimum.
The x-axis shows the Euclidean distance, the y-axis the corresponding average
efficiency. Note the convex shape around the optima.
Efficiency, like the equilibrium growth rate, is a monotonically decreasing
function of the Euclidean distance between the strategy and the production
coefficients, |sa(t) − pi(t)|. This function is not symmetric about the optimum
but has different slopes in different directions from the optimum. Figure 2 shows
how the average efficiency of a strategy decreases as its Euclidean distance to
the optimum increases, when strategies and production coefficients are chosen
at random from the simplex. Note the inverse S-shape of the graphs. As the
Euclidean distance tends to zero, the gradient approaches zero. This implies
that when an evolutionary population of agents converges on the optimum, the
differences in growth caused by a small amount of diversity σ around the optimal
strategy are negligible.
A set of strategies each with identical equilibrium growth rate, say γ′, is
called a level set and forms a contour hypersurface in the strategy simplex. All
strategies that are enveloped by this hypersurface have an equilibrium growth
rate that is higher than γ′. This inner set is convex (for a related proof see Beer,
1980) and so from equation 15 satisfies
∏
i
sia(t)
pii(t) ≥
γ′ + δ
β
. (17)
An important level set is
∏
i sia(t)
pii(t) > δ/β. This is the set of all strate-
gies that have a positive equilibrium growth rate. Its size is proportional to
P [γ > 0 | pi(t)], the probability that a random strategy has a positive equi-
librium growth rate with given production coefficients. Let P [γ > 0] denote
the probability that the equilibrium growth rate is positive if both the strategy
and the production coefficients are chosen independently at random from the
simplex. Figure 3 shows how P [γ > 0] decreases as δ/β increases, for economies
with respectively 2, 4, and 10 investment sectors. The probability tends to zero
as δ/β approaches 1. For given δ/β, the probability that the equilibrium growth
rate of a random strategy is positive decreases as the number of investment sec-
tors increases.
The parameters δ and β determine the equilibrium growth rate associated
with a given hypersurface, as well as the minimum and maximum equilibrium
growth rate that can be achieved with given production coefficients. They do
not affect the location of the optimum nor the shape of level sets, both of which
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Figure 3: Probability of positive growth when the investment strategy and the
production coefficients are chosen independently and at random. The x-axis
shows the ratio δ/β. The y-axis shows the corresponding probability that the
equilibrium growth growth rate is positive.
depend exclusively on the production coefficients. In other words, δ and β define
monotonous transformations of the growth function that are irrelevant to the
order of equilibrium growth rates and to the understanding of the evolutionary
dynamics as a whole. Also, the rate of convergence in equation 13 does not
depend on the scaling factor β. We will make use of this fact later on in the
experimental design where we use a dynamic β for normalization, significantly
reducing the variability of the numeric results.
4 Experimental setup
4.1 The environmental dynamics
The growth function, up to a monotonous transformation, depends on the co-
efficients of a Cobb-Douglas type production function. When the production
coefficients change with the environmental dynamics, strategies that have pre-
viously generated a positive income growth rate can now generate a negative
income growth rate. Agents that have converged on a strategy that has previ-
ously resulted in a high income growth rate can see their income decline and
need to adapt their strategies to the new production coefficients. How does
the magnitude and duration of this decline depend on the type of environmen-
tal dynamics and on the behavioral interactions among the agents? To answer
these questions we model the environmental dynamics as exogenously defined
changes in pi(t). That is, the environmental dynamics that change the produc-
tion coefficients are the independent variable that the policy maker responds to.
The parameters of the imitation mechanism are the dependent variables that
the policy maker aims to regulate.
We focus on two aspects of environmental dynamics: how gradual the en-
vironment changes, and how frequently. In combination they define four types
of environmental dynamics: the production coefficients change gradually and
with low frequency, gradually and with high frequency, suddenly and with low
frequency, and suddenly and with high frequency. We compare these with two
control systems: one without imitation and one with imitation and a static en-
vironment. Without imitation, with strategies that are randomly distributed
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over the strategy space and that stay constant throughout the simulation, the
income growth rate of most agents is most likely negative, irrespective of the
environmental dynamics. Expected log income will decline and welfare at the
population level will be at its lowest. On the other hand, in a static environment
where strategies evolve they are expected to converge on the optimum strategy
and welfare at the population level will be at its highest.
We consider the general case where a change in the production coefficients is
defined as the replacement of one vector of production coefficients by another,
with each vector drawn independently and at random from the uniform distribu-
tion over the simplex
∑
i pii(t) = 1. Replacement is instant for a sudden change
and by linear transition for a slow change. A sudden change can be modeled
by setting the production coefficients of a 2-factor economy to pi = 〈.1, .9〉 up
until time t, and to pi = 〈.4, .6〉 from t + 1 onwards. Such extreme changes are
characteristic of industries that depend on unreliable resources, e.g., a biotic
resource susceptible to climate change like forests or fish. A gradual change can
be modeled by changing pi from 〈.1, , 9〉 at time t to 〈.4, .6〉 at time t+x linearly
over x steps, such that
pi(t + j) =
(x − j)pi(t) + jpi(t + x)
x
, 0 ≤ j ≤ x, (18)
where the conditions
∑
i pii = 1 and pii ≥ 0 for all i are fulfilled at all times.
Such gradual changes are characteristic of industries that depend on reliable
resources, e.g., a mineral resource like iron or coal, where known reserves will
typically last for decades if not centuries.
We model low frequency changes by starting the transition from one vector
of production coefficients to another vector every 50 years, reflecting a Kon-
dratiev type of wave (Kondratiev, 1925) that is characteristic of industries that
are not a driving force of innovation and change only with the general shift in
production methods, e.g., forestry. To model high frequency changes the transi-
tion starts every 10 years, corresponding to the fast business cycles observed by
Cle´ment Juglar (1863). Such frequent changes are characteristic of industries
that invest heavily in research and development, e.g., telecommunications and
biotechnology. That is, while we acknowledge that technological innovations
are driven by research and development, we treat their effect on the production
coefficients as exogenous environmental dynamics that the agents of an industry
have to adapt to. We do not claim that the cycles observed by Kondratiev and
Juglar are caused by this type of exogenous dynamics. We merely use their ob-
servations as examples of frequency patterns that can indeed be detected when
present.
We consider different sequences of production coefficients as different in-
stances of the same environmental dynamics as long as the individual vectors of
production coefficients are replaced with the same gradualness and frequency.
Table 2 summarizes the environmental dynamics used for the experiments.
Figure 4 gives graphic examples of production coefficients that are drawn at
random according to the specification of each environmental dynamics. Each
row of this figure shows five graphs: one each for the time evolution of the four
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Table 2: The environmental dynamics
Environmental Observable Example
dynamics
gradual, low freq. reliable resource, Kondrat. wave oil/gas reserves
sudden, low freq. unreliable resource, Kondrat. wave climate change
gradual, high freq. reliable resource, Juglar’s cycle technol. innovations
sudden, high freq. unreliable resource, Juglar’s cycle biotic resource
production coefficients of a 4-factor economy, and one area plot that combines
the other four graphs into a single graph, stacking the four individual curves one
on top of the other (the upper curve has constant value one), with a different
shade of grey for the area under each curve.
With regard to the dependent variable under control of the policy maker,
the imitation mechanism has one free parameter, diversity σ, and we specify
the optimal behavioral interactions as the diversity σopt(d) that maximizes the
expected log income of each agent under given environmental dynamics d,
σopt(d) = argmax
σ
E(log Y (t) |σ, d). (19)
In order to find this optimal value for different environmental dynamics we
use repeated numerical simulations with different values of σ and measure the
expected log income at the end of each simulation, using standard statistical
methods to reduce variance. Having identified the value σopt(d) at which the
expected log income is highest under a given environmental dynamics, we pro-
ceed to formulate policy advise on the socially optimal level of σ when there is
uncertainty over the type of environmental dynamics. To do so we measure the
expected log income that an optimal value σopt(d) generates on those environ-
mental dynamics d′ 6= d where it is not optimal. We then calculate the value
that policy makers with different degrees of risk aversion assign to each σopt(d).
4.2 Implementation details, model calibration, and scal-
ing
The numerical simulations are based on a discrete synchronous time model
where the income and strategy of each agent is updated in parallel at fixed time
intervals. We consider each time step t to simulate one financial quarter. As
no significant financial market requires a publicly traded company to publish
financial results more than 4 times a year, we consider it the limit of feasibility
to account for growth and to review an economic strategy as often as 4 times a
year. Most economic agents will alter their strategy less often. Each simulation
step is divided into two separate update operations: updating the economy—
each agent invests its income according to its own investment strategy and the
individual incomes and growth are calculated by the non-aggregate growth and
production and growth functions—and updating the strategies, when all agents
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Figure 4: Environmental dynamics: changes in the production coefficients. Each
row illustrates a different type of environmental dynamics. The sequences of
production coefficients are chosen at random. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps (initialization and main experimental phase). The y-axis of the four graphs
positioned at the left of each row shows the value of one particular production
coefficient in a 4-factor economy. The single graphs at the right are area plots
that visually combine the values of the same four production coefficients by
stacking them one on top of the other, with a different shade of grey under each
curve.
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compare their income growth rate with that of their peer group, and when those
agents that decide to imitate change their respective strategies simultaneously.
Each computer simulation spans 500 time steps, simulating 500 financial
quarters or 125 years. These are divided into an initialization phase of 100 time
steps or 25 years, and a main experimental phase of 400 time steps or 100 years.
An initialization phase is needed to avoid influencing the simulation results by
an arbitrary choice of initial values. During initialization the simulated economy
stabilizes and a “natural” distribution of strategies and growth emerges. Initial
conditions are always defined in the same way: all strategies and the initial
production coefficients are drawn independently at random from the simplex.
The production coefficients are kept static throughout the initialization phase
but the agents can imitate in the same way as they do during the main exper-
imental phase, with the same σ. During the 400 time steps (100 years) of the
main experimental phase the agents have to adapt to the dynamic changes in
the production coefficients. To avoid any initialization effect, the increase in log
income is measured from the beginning of the main experimental phase.
Numerical methods are inherently constraint by the availability of computa-
tional resources. The computational complexity of multi-agent systems typically
scales at least polynomially with system size. The accepted method is to ex-
tensively study a system that is large enough to incorporate all the essential
ingredients of the model, and to only increase the system size to test whether
the obtained results are scalable. Here the main experiments are based on an
economy of 200 agents and a 4-factor economy. Sensitivity and scalability are
tested with 1,000 agents and with a 10-factor economy. To understand whether
the results depend on the specific implementation of the evolutionary mecha-
nism we also test more sophisticated implementations: one version where each
agent imitates with probability .1 at every step—as opposed to probability one
in the main experiment—and one version where imitation is partial, such that
a new strategy is a linear combination of the imitated strategy (with weight .1)
and the strategy of the imitating agent (with weight .9). As before, σ controls
the standard deviation of the normally distributed errors per partial strategy.
Recall that the rate of capital deprecation δ (equation 2) and the scaling
factor β (equation 3) of the production function have no effect on the evolution-
ary dynamics and the adaptive behavior of the agents. For the present model
we set δ = .01 per time step—about 4% per year—for all sectors. We use a
dynamic β to reduce variability of the numeric results. As seen in Section 3,
different vectors of production coefficients have different optimal equilibrium
growth rates. To study how efficient the agents adapt to different vectors of
production coefficients, we correct for this variability in optimal growth by dy-
namically normalizing the scaling factor β. To keep the optimal income growth
rate at a value of .005 (i.e., an income growth rate of about 2% per year), we
let the scaling factor β(t) depend on the vector of production coefficients,
β(t) = .015
∏
i
pii(t)
−pii(t). (20)
With this normalization the equilibrium growth rate of all strategies is constraint
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Table 3: Values of economic parameters
population size |P | 200
investment sectors n 4
duration of the initialization phase 100 time steps
duration of the main experimental phase 400 time steps
capital deprecation δ .01
dynamically normalized scaling factor β(t) .015
∏
i pii(t)
−pii(t)
average network connectivity 10
to the range [−.01, .005], where the minimum of −.01 is realized when sia(t)=0
for some positive pii and where the maximum of .005 is realized when sa(t)=
pi(t). Numerical tests show that with these parameter values the probability that
a random strategy has a negative equilibrium growth rate on random production
coefficients is about .65. The values of all economic parameters are listed in
Table 3.
To improve the general validity of our results we use large number of numer-
ical simulations where—rather than closely calibrating those factors that affect
the evolutionary dynamics on a specific economy—we define broad parameter
ranges and collect statistical information over a representative sample of differ-
ent possible economies that fall within these ranges. For example, in order to
obtain results that are valid for the general class of scale-free social networks
with a high cluster coefficient, each simulation is based on an independent ran-
dom instance of the social network. Likewise, in order to obtain general results
for specific environmental dynamics, each simulation uses an independent ran-
dom sequences of production coefficients, which are replaced according to the
gradualness and frequency of the respective environmental dynamics. The num-
ber of simulations needed to obtain reliable statistical results are determined by
standard methods of variance reduction.
5 Results
5.1 Economic significance of diversity
Figure 5 shows the expected log income of an agent for different values of the
diversity control parameter σ, for the two control systems and the four types
of environmental dynamics. 50,000 simulations are used for each graph. 500
different values of σ from the range [0, .5] are evaluated, and results are averaged
over 100 simulations per value. The plots are smoothed with a moving average
with a window size of ten values.
In the first graph of Figure 5—the control system without imitation—expected
log income is uniformly negative for all levels of σ. This graph is based on a
static environment, but the same is observed for any environmental dynamics.
All other graphs of Figure 5 show systems with imitation and there is a clear
functional relation between the value of σ and log income. For each system there
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Figure 5: Expected log income as a function of the diversity parameter σ
is a single optimum σopt(d) that maximizes log income under the given environ-
mental dynamics d, exact values are given in Table 4. The value of σopt(d) is
higher for more frequent changes than for less frequent changes, and higher for
sudden changes than for gradual changes. Its value is lowest in the static en-
vironment. Further to this, the graphs show a clear pattern in the relationship
between σ and expected log income: the slope to the left of the optima, i.e., for
small values of σ, is much steeper than to the right, where σ is large. We will
revisit this fact in our discussion of policy advise under uncertainty.
Our first research question can now be answered: almost any level of diversity
σ will allow the evolutionary agents to reach a positive log income under any
environmental dynamics, yet a unique optimum where log income is highest can
Table 4: Optimal level of diversity σ for each type of environmental dynamics
static gradual, sudden, gradual, sudden,
low freq. low freq. high freq. high freq.
Optimal σ .005 .008 .046 .057 .123
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Table 5: Expected log income when a value of σ that is optimal under one
environmental dynamics is applied to other environmental dynamics
Environmental
dynamics that
σ is applied to
Environmental dynamics that σ was optimized for
static gradual sudden gradual sudden
low freq. low freq. high freq. high freq.
Optimal σ .005 .008 .046 .057 .123
static 1.996 1.995 1.952 1.934 1.794
gradual, low freq. 1.988 1.991 1.969 1.959 1.880
sudden, low freq. 1.117 1.250 1.412 1.406 1.331
gradual, high freq. 0.550 0.721 1.377 1.385 1.308
sudden, high freq. -0.042 0.092 0.529 0.548 0.596
Note: Each column shows the expected log income when the diversity σ that is
optimal for one type of environmental dynamics is applied to another type of
environmental dynamics. Each row shows the expected log income when agents
adapt to a specific environmental dynamics with a value σ that is optimal for
another dynamics.
be identified for each environmental dynamics. So while it is not mandatory
to define policies that effect σ, in the sense that imitating agents can almost
always return to positive growth, it is optimal in the sense that there can be a
significant gain in expected log income.
5.2 Policy advise under uncertainty
When the type of environmental dynamics that affects an economy is unknown,
the optimal diversity σ depends on the risk preference of the policy maker. We
consider four types of risk preference: extreme risk seeking (maxmax), modest
risk seeking (max average), modest risk aversion (minimax regret), and extreme
risk aversion (maxmin). We calculate the optimal value for each preference from
a generalization table where each σ that is optimal under one environmental
dynamics is applied to the other tested environmental dynamics, including the
static environment. The result is shown in Table 5. Each row shows the expected
log income for the same environmental dynamics but different σ, each column
shows results for the same σ but different environmental dynamics. Each entry is
averaged over 10,000 simulations (with different instances of the social network
and different random sequences of production coefficients). The values in the
diagonal are highest for each row, confirming that the optimal value is indeed
the best choice for a given environmental dynamics.
For each risk preference, each tested σ can now be associated with an ex-
pected value, and the σ with the best such value is considered optimal for the
type of risk preference. This is shown in Table 6. Each row shows the value
associated with each σ under a given risk adversity, with the optimal value in
Italic type. A risk seeker looks at the highest expected log income that each
tested σ has achieved under the different environmental dynamics, and chooses
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Table 6: Optimal policy advise under uncertainty and different degrees of risk
aversion
Type of policy
maker/society
Environmental dynamics that σ was optimized for
static gradual sudden gradual sudden
low freq. low freq. high freq. high freq.
Optimal σ .005 .008 .046 .057 .123
risk seeking 1.996 1.995 1.969 1.959 1.880
risk neutral 1.122 1.210 1.448 1.446 1.382
minimal regret 0.835 0.664 0.067 0.062 0.202
risk averse -0.042 0.092 0.529 0.548 0.596
Note: Each entry is calculated from a column of Table 5 and shows the value
that a risk preference assigns to a particular diversity σ. Each row shows the
value that is optimal under that risk preference in Italic type (minimum for
minimal regret, maximum for the others).
the highest of these. Risk neutrality means choosing the σ that maximizes the
average expected log income over all environmental dynamics. Under minimal
regret the σ is chosen that minimizes the greatest possible difference between ac-
tual log income and the best log income that could have been achieved. Minimal
regret first calculates the maximum possible regret for each σ and all environ-
ments, and then chooses the σ that minimizes this maximum. Risk aversion
means choosing the σ that promises the highest minimum log income under any
environmental dynamics.
The numerical results clearly show that under uncertainty the optimal value
of σ rises with the degree of risk aversion. This is in line with our earlier ob-
servation about the functional relationship between σ and expected log income:
the gradient is steeper for lower values of σ than for higher values, which makes
higher values of σ the safer bet. These observations are confirmed by the con-
trol experiments that test for sensitivity and scalability and that use alternative
implementations of the imitation mechanism.
We also tested more sophisticated imitation mechanisms where either only
a random selection of 10% of all agents would imitate per step, or where im-
itation was partial, such that a new strategy is a linear combination of the
imitated strategy and the strategy of the imitating agent (again with normally
distributed errors per partial strategy). We also made the selection process—
the choice of which agent to imitate—dependend on income instead of growth.
The arrangement of optimal values σopt(d) is similar for each environmental
dynamics. The gradient is always steeper for small values of σ than for large
ones. Under uncertainty the optimal value of σ always increases with the degree
of risk aversion.
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5.3 Evolutionary dynamics
Figure 6–11 show the evolution of some key statistics during the 500 times steps
of the simulation. Figure 6 discusses the control systems without imitation (a
static environment is used). Figure 7 discusses the control system with imita-
tion and a static environment. The remaining four figures show the four types
of environmental dynamics where agents imitate and where changes occur grad-
ually and with low frequency (Figure 8), gradually and with high frequency
(Figure 9), suddenly and with low frequency (Figure 10), and suddenly and
with high frequency (Figure 11).
Each figure contains six statistics that describe the economic performance
of the agent population, the heterogeneity of their strategies, and the relevance
of connectivity in the social network at each of the 500 time steps of the simu-
lation. These statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. Each simulation
uses a different instance of the social network and a different sequence of vectors
of production coefficients. Two area plots on top of each group of six illustrate
how the production coefficients change under the respective environmental dy-
namics. Each area plot shows a single different random sequence of production
coefficients. To further ease the analysis, in Figure 8–11 dotted vertical lines
are inserted into each area plot and each of the six statistics to show the points
in time where the transition to a new set of production coefficients starts.
All statistics react visibly to any change in the production coefficients. This
is particularly interesting for those environmental dynamics where change oc-
curs gradually, because when a new vector of random production coefficients is
introduced only the momentum changes, not the rate of change. And yet there
is a clear and strong economic response to this change in momentum. Note that
many statistics have reached some sort of equilibrium after the 100 steps of the
initialization phase.
Of the six statistics, the first four visualize the economic performance of
the agents. The first statistic shows the average efficiency (see equation 16)
over all strategies, allowing a direct comparison to what rational agents with
perfect information would achieve. The second statistic shows the behavior of
the Gini coefficient, a measure of how egalitarian the accumulated capital is
distributed. The third statistic shows average log income, which generally be-
haves as expected: after each change the income level drops temporarily, only
to grow continuously thereafter. The fourth statistic shows average log growth,
which falls dramatically immediately after a change, as most strategies become
obsolete, but peaks within no less than ten time steps after the change, in-
dicating that the recovery process of our evolutionary economy starts almost
immediately after a change. The fifth statistic measures the variance of partial
strategies within the population and shows how the heterogeneity of strategies
is affected by a change in production coefficients. As discussed in Section 2.4, at
equilibrium the square root of this variance approaches the value of the diver-
sity control parameter σ. The sixth and final statistic measures the covariance
between log income and connectivity, to emphasize the effect of a skewed distri-
bution of connectivity on the evolutionary process. It shows how the correlation
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between log income and network connectivity rises each time that a new change
in the production coefficients is initiated. Evidently the highly connected agents
are among the first to learn and profit from the improved strategies.
When read in combination with statistic one through four on economic per-
formance, the fifth statistic on the variance of partial strategies allows us to
identify the different phases of the adaptive evolutionary search process. Af-
ter each onset of a new environmental change the standard deviation of par-
tial strategies peaks for a brief period, then drops rapidly, and finally returns
slowly to its former state. This shows that in the immediate aftermath of a
change those agents that were previously most successful loose their attractive
power—average efficiency is at its lowest—and that the diversity of the pool of
strategies increases significantly. This is the early phase of unstructured explo-
ration. As the agents evaluate new strategies, some agents are more successful
than others—average efficiency rises again—and get heavily imitated, leading
to a rapid decline in diversity. This is the second phase of structured, directed
search. What is remarkable is that during this second phase the average effi-
ciency declines for a second time and reaches a low point between ten to twenty
time steps after the onset of the environmental change. Finally, during the
last phase of exploration, the agents seem to finally settle into the new order.
Average efficiency increases again, and as more and more agents approach the
(moving) optimum, they diversify around it.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the general question of how different types of environmental
dynamics affect behavioral interaction in an evolutionary economy. For this pur-
pose a simple model of evolutionary formation of investment strategies through
variation and selection was presented. Variation occurs when an agent replaces
its own strategy by that of another agent (imitation) in an imperfect way. Se-
lection occurs when an agent bases its choice to imitate another agent on some
property of the other agent, here individual income growth. The evolutionary
mechanism has one free parameter that controls diversity by defining how closely
agents imitate each other. This parameter has a clear policy dimension as there
are various laws and regulations that regulate how closely agents imitate each
other.
If agents in an economy with a Cobb-Douglas type production function use
relative income growth rate to determine which agent to imitate, the evolu-
tionary dynamics are governed by the equilibrium growth rate of a strategy.
This equilibrium growth rate is uniquely determined by the production coef-
ficients of the Cobb-Douglas function. Modeling environmental dynamics as
dynamic changes in these production coefficients enables us to study the impact
of such environmental dynamics on the optimal behavioral interactions. This
is a general approach that can be applied to model technological or macroeco-
nomic dynamics as well as environmental hazards like (climate change induced)
desertification and diseases.
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We specified four different types of environmental dynamics that differ in the
gradualness and frequency of change. We further specified one control system
without imitation and one control system with imitation and a static environ-
ment. To achieve general results that are valid for a broad class of economies,
all numerical results were based on large number of computer simulations, each
with different instances of those factors that affect the evolutionary dynamic.
Our first research question was whether or not different values for the di-
versity control parameter are optimal under different environmental dynamics.
We established that for almost all tested values of this parameter and all tested
environments the agents quickly adapt and find strategies with a positive equi-
librium growth rate. We found further that each environmental dynamics has
a unique optimal diversity that maximizes log income. This optimum increases
with the frequency and rapidity of the changes.
Our second research question was whether or not different policies can be
defined for different degrees of risk aversion when the type of environmental
dynamics is unknown. Here we found that if there is uncertainty about the
environmental dynamics, the optimal value for σ increases with the degree of risk
aversion. The generality of our findings were confirmed by control experiments
that tested for scalability and sensitivity of the economic parameters and that
used alternative implementations of the imitation mechanism.
Various types of public policies directly and indirectly affect the imitation be-
havior of economic agents, the diversity of their investment strategies, and their
ability to adapt to a changing environment. Numeric simulations of stochastic
multi-agent systems can be used to evaluate such policies even when there is
uncertainty on the specific nature of the environmental dynamics. Despite, or
rather because of, their stochastic nature they can identify the preferred policy
under a particular degree of risk aversion.
Appendix: Evolution with variable prices
The interested reader will be curious to know how variable prices affect the
evolutionary process. Regardless of the market structure and price formation,
equation 2 for non-aggregate growth per investment sector i can be extended to
include a dynamic price pi(t),
Kia(t) =
sia(t)Ya(t − 1)
pi(t)
+ (1 − δ)Kia(t − 1). (21)
The ratio of capital to income (equation 13) now converges to
lim
t→∞
Kia(t)
Ya(t)
= lim
t→∞
sia(t)/pi(t)
γa(t) + δ
. (22)
The existence of this limit and the speed of convergence depend on the behavior
of pi(t). If the price converges, the ratio of capital to income will converge as
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well. In that case the growth rate at equilibrium is
γa(t) = β
∏
i
pi(t)
−pii(t)
∏
i
sia(t)
pii(t) − δ. (23)
That is, as long as the market structure does not prevent the capital-income
ratio to converge in reasonable time, variable prices have a similar effect on the
evolutionary process as the scaling factor. Both are monotonous transformations
of the growth function that do not effect the evolutionary dynamics.
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Figure 6: Average time evolution of an economy without imitation (the envi-
ronment is static). The two area plots on top show single random sequences of
production coefficients. The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simula-
tions. The x-axis shows the 500 time steps while the y-axis shows the respective
statistics. .
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Figure 7: Average time evolution of an economy and a static environment. The
two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the
500 time steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics. Note how most
statistics have stabilized during the first 100 steps of the initialization phase..
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Figure 8: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic
environment characterized by gradual, low frequency changes. The two area
plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients. The other
statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics. .
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Figure 9: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic
environment characterized by gradual, high frequency changes. The two area
plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients. The other
statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics. .
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Figure 10: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic
environment characterized by sudden, low frequency changes. The two area
plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients. The other
statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics. .
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Figure 11: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic
environment characterized by sudden, high frequency changes. The two area
plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients. The other
statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics. .
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